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Abstract 
The modern Moroccan state seen today is very young. Having only been independent from 
France since 1956, the country has spent the last sixty-four years crafting its post-colonial 
statehood. What has emerged is a hybrid political system with powers split, however unequally, 
between the King and his inner circle, known as the makhzen, and the Parliament. Not only is the 
monarchy constitutional—meaning that its legitimacy is literally written into the primary 
governing document of Morocco, which had its last referendum in 2011—but it is also self-
sustaining and self-legitimizing, for the monarchy uses its constitutional powers to grant itself 
further powers and enforce its approved social order. One of the primary ways any state enforces 
its approved social order is through public violence and/or the threat of public violence. This 
paper will explore how the use of and meaning behind public violence in Morocco has shifted 
from its independence in 1956 to today, specifically through analyzing the political development 
of capital punishment, or the death penalty. As of 2011, an organization called the Advocates for 
Humans Rights reports that there are approximately 150 people on death row in Morocco. 
Ultimately, this paper will contribute to the growing literature discussing the human rights 
implications of the continued use of the death penalty worldwide and what its abolition could 
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 Introduction 
 The modern Moroccan state emerged from French colonial rule in 1956, well beyond the 
beginning of the French Revolution and the 1789 serving as the marker of the end of the early 
modern era. As a state that is, as of 2020, only sixty-four years old, capital punishment in 
Morocco has undergone expedited political development. It has, however, followed the same 
general shift as other countries whose political development of capital punishment has occurred 
over centuries, although Morocco’s shift has been extremely expedited to keep up with the 
overwhelming call for the abolition of the death penalty worldwide today. Under King Hassan II, 
who ruled Morocco from 1961 until his death in 1999, the primary purpose of enforcing the 
death penalty was to legitimize Morocco’s external sovereignty by proving its capability as a 
sovereign, newly independent nation. As King Hassan II’s rule was threatened by multiple 
attempted coups in the 1970s, however, the purpose of issuing death sentences in Morocco 
quickly shifted to hold the primary purpose of legitimizing the state’s internal sovereignty by 
proving to Moroccans that the state was capable of enforcing its laws and approved social order 
and eliminating internal threats to those pillars of society. 
 Although no one has been executed since Mohamed Mustapha Tabet—a police 
commissioner in Casablanca who was executed in 1993 for the rapes of approximately 1,600 
women over tens or so years—the continued issuance of death sentences in Morocco has led to a 
long-standing debate between authorities—the King, his inner circle, known as the Makhzen, and 
Parliament—and civil society. Because the de facto moratorium on executions in Morocco has 
failed to become a de jure moratorium through legislation, many non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) in the country have formed since 1993 to advocate the abolition of the 
death penalty in the country due to its cruel and inhuman nature.  
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 This paper will begin by discussing the human right to life as declared in the UN’s 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights before delving into the political development of capital 
punishment in the modern Moroccan state (1956-present). The paper will then explore the shift 
of capital punishment’s purpose from the post-colonial period—when the death penalty was used 
to legitimize Morocco’s external and internal sovereignty at the same time whilst state-making 
under King Hassan II (1961-1999)—to the present-day period of debate and advocacy for the 
abolition of the death penalty while the country undergoes forms of democratization under King 
Mohammed VI (1999-present). The paper will conclude with an analysis of the Moroccan and 
international NGO’s calling for the abolition of the death penalty in the country and a discussion 
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Methodology 
Research Design 
 This paper is a historical analysis rooted in broad research of various topics relating to the 
political development of capital punishment in Morocco, with special attention paid to specific 
cases in which the death penalty was handed down as a sentence. While this was not originally 
the plan for this paper, the outbreak of COVID-19 has made this the case. Prior to my return 
home, I was still planning for this project to be a historical analysis based off of other primary 
and secondary sources, but I was also planning to conduct in depth interviews with scholars, 
employees of relevant non-governmental organizations in Rabat and Casablanca such as 
Amnesty International and the Moroccan Coalition Against the Death Penalty, justice officials, 
and ultimately, if I could find the right people to talk to, former prisoners and family members of 
prisoners who have had first-hand experience with the Moroccan criminal justice system and its 
inner workings. Upon my return home, all research was conducted remotely using databases, 
email exchanges, news outlet websites, and other scholarly sources. While it is obviously not 
ideal to be conducting research about Morocco from the United States, the resources made 
available to me through the SIT staff in Morocco, my advisor, and, of course, the internet have 
made this project possible.  
 
Assumptions 
 Prior to beginning my research into the political development of capital punishment in 
Morocco, I assumed that I would have much more access to my subject, not only in terms of my 
expectation that I would be conducting this research in Morocco, but also in terms of 
governmental restrictions on the inner workings of the criminal justice system. Furthermore, I 
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assumed that since the last execution—that of Mohamed Mustapha Tabet in 1993 for the rape of 
over 1,600 women in Casablanca—most death sentences that have been handed down have been 
for crimes relating to terrorism due to Morocco having felt the reverberations of the Arab Spring 
throughout the entire Middle East and North Africa in 2011 and Morocco’s own recent terrorist 
attacks. Finally, because Morocco’s former imperial oppressor is France, I assumed that the 
framework for Morocco’s current criminal justice system is based off of the French system and 
the system the French enforced while occupying Morocco from 1912-1956. It is important to 
note that for this paper, I am defining the modern Moroccan state as the post-colonial, 
independent Morocco beginning in 1956 and considering deaths and forced disappearances at the 
hand of the state as the implementation of the death penalty.  
 
Ethics 
 By nature of being born in a white body in a world where whiteness has consistently been 
defined as inherently civilized and the racist colonialism driven by white people has been 
excused as the mere taming of the “uncivilized,” I have been given immense power in the 
institutionalized racial hierarchy that defines all countries whose histories include exploitation at 
the hands of white colonialism. This system of a moral “us” as the civilizers of an immoral 
“them” is so entrenched in society that no matter the benevolent intentions behind white people’s 
social justice work, the results of this work, and even the work itself, can never be entirely pure. 
Thus, it is imperative that in conducing this research and producing this final report, I address the 
impact my being a white, western woman has on the conclusions I come to. For example, 
Americans especially are trained to be believe liberal democracy to be superior to all other forms 
of government. Children raised in the United States are taught to believe that America is the 
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center of the world and that democracy is the only right form of government. We are raised to 
look down on other forms of countries for not having liberal democratic governments, even if 
those countries are our close historical allies. We are raised to judge monarchs—especially non-
Western monarchy—with suspicion and view monarchs’ subjects with pity. We have been raised 
to believe that the final form of human government is liberal democracy, and that striving to 
achieve liberal democracy is the end goal to which all countries should strive. Such a belief, 
however, is entirely misguided. Democracy is not inherently better than other systems of 
government, and while it is what I am used to, it is not up to America or Americans to impose 
the imperfect system on others.   
 Aside from my positionality, there are other limitations that factor into the ethical 
ramifications of this paper. Firstly, the language barrier has proved challenging. Because I do not 
speak Arabic or French, my range of sources has been limited to fewer articles than I would have 
had access to in producing this paper. Furthermore, as I mentioned above, I am researching for 
and writing this paper from the United States, not from the country I am researching and writing 
about. Finally, I am researching and writing about vulnerable populations—prisoners and those 
on death row. Not only do I not have first-hand experience interacting with them, but it is also 
imperative that I note the inherent imbalance of powers at play. 
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Background 
Crimes Punishable by Death in Morocco 
 In order to have a thorough discussion and analysis of the death penalty in Morocco can 
take place, it is imperative that a list of crimes punishable by death in Morocco is included to 
provide context. In “Towards the Complete Abolition of Capital Punishment in Morocco: 
Possibilities and Constraints” (2013), a chapter of Death Penalty: A Cruel and Inhuman 
Punishment, Salim Hmimnat lists which offenses are punishable by death in Morocco. These 
offensives are, as Hmimnat explains, are listed in a set of laws. These laws are the criminal law 
and Penal Code, the Anti-Terrorism Law, the Military Justice Law, and “the Dahir (a King’s 
decree) related to crimes against the nation’s health” (Hmimnat 2013, pp. 70). All crimes listed 
below have been summarized for brevity and clarity from Hmimnat’s piece. 
 In regard to criminal law and the Penal Code, Hmimnat notes that the Moroccan 
legislature lists six sub-sections of offenses against state security that carry the death penalty.1  
I. An attack on the life of the King, Crown Prince, or any member of the royal family; 
II. Crimes against external state security, including treason and espionage; 
III. Crimes against internal state security; 
IV. Crimes against internal state security resulting from joint action between civil authorities 
and the military; 
V. Various crimes related to willful violence with murderous intent and assault and battery 
(especially relating to the deaths of newborns and children under 15 years of age), torture, 
castration, and kidnapping and abduction; 
 
1 These laws are listed in the 1st part of the 3rd Book of the Penal Code. 
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VI. Various crimes related to arson, vandalism using explosives, and the willful destruction 
of public works (Hmimnat 2013, pp. 71). 
 In regard to Military Justice Law, military personnel are subject to the death penalty for 
various crimes, including: desertion and inciting desertion, arson of buildings and equipment 
relating to national defense forces, participation in a conspiracy to disobey a commanding 
officer’s orders, obstruction of a defensive action, and joining and recruiting for a foreign power 
at war with Morocco (Hmimnat 2013, pp. 72).2  
 In regard to Anti-Terrorism Law, the death penalty is listed as punishment for a number 
of crimes already listed in criminal law, but, as Hmimnat notes, “defines Crimes of Terrorism as 
having an intentional relationship with an individual or collective plot that endangers public 
order through intimidation or violence, resulting in the death of one or more persons” (Hmimnat 
2013, pp. 72).3 These include crimes related to: kidnapping and abduction; white collar crimes 
(including forgery, counterfeiting, theft, and embezzlement), especially relating to seals and 
imprints of the Kingdom; destruction of any means of transportation; “illegal manufacture, 
possession, transfer, promotion, or use of weapons and explosives;” participation in a terrorist 
cell and knowingly receiving goods related to terrorism; and introduction of a substance that 
endangers human health, animal health, or the environment (Hmimnat 2013, pp. 72-73). 
 Finally, Hmimnat explains that the Dahir on crimes against the nation’s health, the first 
chapter stipulates that “any person who consciously makes materials or products intended for 
human nutrition that endanger public health is punishable by death” (Hmimnat 2013, pp. 73).4 
 
2 These laws are listed in Articles 183 to 187 of the 10th section of the Law on Military Justice. 
3 These laws are listed in the 03-03 Anti-Terrorism Law.  
4 Hmimnat emphasizes that in accordance with the four aforementioned laws, over 600 death have been passed. 
Cases relating to criminal law account for 283 of them. This number may soon be reduced to 11 cases reflecting 
particularly serious murder crimes, however, due to current plans to amend the criminal laws on the books 
(Hmimnat 2013, pp. 73-74). 
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Method of Execution in Morocco 
 To fully contextualize the death penalty in Morocco, it is also necessary to explain the 
method of execution used by the state in carrying out the death penalty. After listing the crimes 
punishable by the death penalty in “Towards the Complete Abolition of Capital Punishment in 
Morocco: Possibilities and Constraints” (2013), Hmimnat continues to explain the regulations in 
place by the Moroccan legislature that dictate the implementation of the death penalty. The 
information below has been summarized for brevity and clarity from Hmimnat’s piece. 
 The procedure to be followed in implementing the death penalty is listed in Chapter II 
(Articles 601 to 607) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It states that the Office of Public 
Prosecution should report all death sentences to the Minister of Justice through the Directorate of 
Criminal Affairs and Pardons. It also states that no one can be put to death until all appeals have 
been exhausted. These appeals for amnesty are issued to the Public Prosecutor, the Amnesty 
Commission, and the King (Hmimnat 2013, pp. 73). 
 Executions are carried out by firing squad comprised of military authorities at the orders 
of the Minister of Justice at a secret location. The following people are required to be present at 
all executions to serve as witnesses: the President of the Criminal Chamber or the person who 
issued the sentence, a magistrate or judge from the region where the execution is taking place, 
the director of the prison, a representative of the armed forces, the prison doctor, a representative 
of the faith which the person to be executed ascribes to, and two legal witnesses known as 
adouls. After execution, the body is given to families for private burials or buried by the 
appropriate authorities if the family does not wish to bury the body (Hmimnat 2013, pp. 73).5 
 
5 Hmimnat notes that the state’s official statistics list 50 executions from 1963-1974, mostly for political reasons. 
There were 2 executions from 1982-1993 for crimes listed under criminal law. The system has pardoned all but 13 
of those sentenced to death. In October of 2009, which was the most recent data available upon the publication of 
Hmimnat’s piece, there were 129 people sentenced to death, 6 of whom were women (Hmimnat 2013, pp. 74). 
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Literature Review 
 States have long used violence as a means of legitimizing their own rule. Charles Tilly, a 
pre-eminent American sociologist and political scientist in the late twentieth and early twenty-
first centuries, argued that such a states’ engagement in such violence is the key to a the making 
of a legitimate state. In his 1982 piece “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” 
Tilly argued that states are essentially racketeers of violence: they create the very violence that 
they protect their citizens from. “A tendency to monopolize the means of violence,” Tilly writes, 
“makes a government’s claim to provide protection, in either the comforting or the ominous 
sense of the word, more credible and harder to resist” (Tilly 1982, pp. 2). According to Tilly, the 
first activity of violence racketeering is war making, which is when states eliminate or neutralize 
enemies outside of their territories. The second activity is state making, which is when states 
eliminate or neutralize enemies within their territories. The third activity is protection, which is 
when states eliminate or neutralize the “enemies of their clients;” and the fourth and final 
activity, Tilly argues, is extraction, which is when the state acquires the means of carrying out 
the first three activities (Tilly 1982, pp. 15). Thus, states have a monopoly on violence, defining 
for their citizens what violence is and deciding for their citizens what they need protection from. 
 Thus, inflicting public violence upon offenders of the social order has historically 
served—and still serves in many cases—as a thinly veiled attempt by the state to legitimize 
itself, its approved social order, and further entrench its power over its citizens. One way a state 
does this is through state sanctioned murder and capital punishment. The death penalty is one of 
the oldest forms of punishment inflicted by states and has been practiced by most societies 
throughout human history, as David Garland writes in “Modes of Capital Punishment: The Death 
Penalty in Historical Perspective” (Garland 2011, pp. 30).  Echoing Tilly’s claim that violence is 
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key to state making, Garland argues that in the early modern period, which is most often defined 
by historians as ranging from the end of the Middle Ages in 1500 to the beginning of the French 
Revolution in 1789, “newly emergent state authorities took up the death penalty and accorded it 
a central role in the task of state building” because it allowed them to create a monopoly on 
legitimate violence (Garland 2011, pp. 30). Adopting harsh capital punishment not only allowed 
new states to maintain order, do justice, and reinforce social hierarchies, for “at the core of the 
death penalty’s meaning was the assertion, preservation, and protection of the authority of the 
state” (Garland 2011, pp. 37). The death penalty was inherently politically driven, allowing new 
states to demonstrate sovereignty and to legitimize their authority not only to its subjects, but to 
other states that remained skeptical of the new state. 
 By the mid-nineteenth century, however, the role that capital punishment played in 
society changed, for the state no longer needed the death penalty to prove its power and 
legitimacy. “In a context of increasingly well-established and rationalized states,” Garland 
insists, “capital punishment’s primary purpose had altered so that what had once been an 
instrument of rule, essential to state security, became an instrument of penal policy, focused on 
the narrower goals of doing justice and controlling crime” (Garland 2011, pp. 30-31). While 
acting as the hand of justice was a purpose of capital punishment in the early modern era, it was 
not the primary purpose. As states moved beyond state making and the need to demonstrate 
external sovereignty to other states, however, the purpose of issuing death sentences shifted to 
demonstrating internal sovereignty over its own subjects. Essentially, capital punishment’s 
purpose became “the enforcement of law rather than the display of power” (Garland 2011, pp. 
40-41). While Garland’s argument about the shift of capital punishment’s purpose from power 
display in the early-modern era to crime control in the modern era holds weight in older western 
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societies, it does not explain the political development of capital punishment in younger, non-
western states. In other words, because Morocco is such a young state, it underwent Garland’s 
shift of capital punishment from proving external sovereignty to enforcing internal sovereignty in 
approximately thirty years, rather than Garlands’ argued timeline that spans centuries. 
 By the last execution and Morocco’s adoption of a moratorium on executions in 1993, 
this shift was complete, and by the time King Mohammed VI ascended to the throne in 1999, 
debate nationwide was increasing about fully abolishing the death penalty. Why, then, has 
Morocco not fully adopted de jure abolition through legislation despite not having executed 
anyone for almost thirty years? This is the question that Salim Hmimnat tackles in “Towards the 
Complete Abolition of Capital Punishment in Morocco: Possibilities and Constraints” (2013), 
which is “a political analysis of the Moroccan experience in dealing with the issue of capital 
punishment,” focusing specifically on the “possibilities and constraints” in moving from de facto 
to de jure abolition (Hmimnat 2013, pp. 69). Hmimnat begins by outlining which crimes are 
punishable by death in Morocco and the method of execution used in implementing the death 
penalty.6 
  In discussing why Morocco’s move from de facto to de jure abolition of capital 
punishment has been stalled, Hmimnat then explains that the issue of the death penalty is not a 
priority for many reformers, many of whom focus instead on the territorial issues of Western 
Sahara, terrorism, and social and economic crises (Hmimnat 2013, pp. 75). The reformers who 
do focus on advocating for the abolition of the death penalty, however, are often members of 
three pre-eminent NGOs: the Moroccan Observatory of Prisons, the Arab Penal Reform 
Organization, and Together Against the Death Penalty. All three NGOs convened at two events 
 
6 The crimes punishable by death and the method of execution used in implementing the death penalty in Morocco 
are listed in the preceding “Background” section.  
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held in Meknés in 2003 and 2004, and the success of the panels “signaled the willingness of both 
civil society and the state to open up and extend the debate on the issue” (Hmimnat 2013, pp. 
75). This does not mean, Hmimnat reiterates, that the abolition of the death penalty is a priority 
for politicians either, noting that “few political parties have declared a clear position on the issue, 
because it remains contentious and controversial. This reluctance is compounded by the State’s 
equivocal position and the insecurity of political parties in general” (Hmimnat 2013, pp. 79). 
Although Hmimnat notes that the final decision regarding the fate of capital punishment is 
constitutionally left to the King, he concludes by listing three reasons that the Moroccan state has 
failed to shift from de facto to de jure abolition. These reasons are “the lack of political and 
social consensus on the subject,” “the weight of traditional and religious reference,” and 
“constraints to maintain public security” (Hmimnat 2013, pp. 85-86). 
 Unfortunately, Hmimnat’s chapter, “Towards the Complete Abolition of Capital 
Punishment in Morocco: Possibilities and Constraints,” was the only piece of literature 
accessible to me during this research project that focused solely on capital punishment in 
Morocco, most likely due to remote research and language barriers. Thus, much of my research 
builds off of his piece. While Hmimnat’s piece answers the question of why Morocco has been 
unable to shift from de facto to de jure abolition of capital punishment through the analysis of 
legal codes, NGO actions and essential but broad background information, my paper, on the 
other hand, will analyze the political development of capital punishment in Morocco through a 
historical analysis and the discussion of specific cases. Ultimately, my paper will add to 
Hmimnat’s discussion of capital punishment in Morocco by answering the question of how the 
use of and meaning behind issuing death sentences in Morocco has shifted from its independence 
in 1956 to today.  
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Analysis 
The Right to Life: Capital Punishment in the Human Rights Context 
 In the aftermath of the atrocities of World War II, the UN General Assembly gathered to 
pass the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Motivated by the blatant “disregard and 
contempt for human rights [that] resulted in barbarous acts which… outraged the conscience of 
mankind” as seen during the war, the UN moved to pass the Declaration in “recognition of the 
inherent dignity and… equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family [as] the 
foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world” (The United Nations, 1948, art. 21.3). 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was passed nearly unanimously, with forty-eight 
member states voting in favor, eight member states abstaining, and two member states not 
voting. Since its adoption on December 10, 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
has been considered the principal document in the worldwide human rights movement aiming to 
guarantee the rights of all individuals across the globe. 
 In “Towards the Complete Abolition of Capital Punishment in Morocco: Possibilities and 
Constraints,” Hmimnat notes that the death penalty “was until the late 1970s considered a 
legitimate manifestation of the state’s sovereignty to respond to certain serious crimes” 
(Hmimnat 2013, pp. 69). He reiterates, however, that “the right to life is the most fundamental 
human right and underpins all other rights,” and that the growing strength of the universal human 
rights movement has shed light on capital punishment’s implementation as a violation of human 
rights, especially since the end of the Cold War era and the dissolution of the Soviet bloc in the 
early 1990s (Hmimnat 2013, pp. 69).  
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Capital Punishment in the Modern Moroccan State 
King Hassan II and the Years of Lead 
 When Morocco was declared independent from France in 1956, the new country, like any 
newly independent nation, initially struggled in its new transitional phrase. This new post-
protectorate phase began when King Mohammed V returned from exile in November 1955 and 
continued through his five-year reign that ended when his son, King Hassan II, ascended to the 
throne in 1961. During King Mohammed V’s rule, the newly reestablished monarchy benefited, 
as Jonathan Wyrtzen writes in “The Monarchy and Identity in Post-Protectorate Morocco,” a 
chapter in his 2015 book Making Morocco: Colonial Intervention and the Politics of Identity, 
from the maintenance of power ascribed to the Moroccan units as they transferred from French 
and Spanish rule to the King’s rule. “Over the next five years,” Wyrtzen writes, “the newly 
christened Royal Armed Forced (RAF) confirmed the post-protectorate state’s ability to 
monopolize the use of force in the space of the nation-state” (Wyrtzen 2015, pp. 275). In other 
words, ensured during the independence talks was the military prowess the new nation would 
have, thereby setting up the newly independent modern Moroccan state to have external 
sovereignty in resisting foreign enemies and internal sovereignty in resisting domestic enemies.  
  When Hassan II became king in 1961, he sought to further establish state sovereignty—
both external and internal—and consolidate royal power, often resorting to methods relying 
heavily on force. As Abdelaziz Nouaydi writes in the chapter “Morocco: The Imperative of 
Democratic Transition” in the 2003 book Human Rights Under African Constitutions: Realizing 
the Promise for Ourselves, the following decades saw authoritarian practices sweep the country 
in what became known as the Years of Lead. “Thousands were arrested, tortured, and sentenced 
to heavy sentences,” he notes, and “hundreds were forced to exile and hundreds of others were 
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victims of enforced disappearances” (Nouaydi 2003, pp. 155). Most often, the targets of the 
arrests, torture, and forced disappearances were those the monarchy saw as a threat to its internal 
sovereignty and authority to rule within its borders. Because many forced disappearances result 
in either immediate or eventual death and the deprivation of the right to life, they are, at their 
core, state sanctioned murder and therefore should be considered as the implementation of 
capital punishment. According to the “Summary of the Final Report” released in 2006 by the 
Truth and Justice Commission, 742 people were subject to capital punishment in the form of 
forced disappearances during the Years of Lead (Kingdom of Morocco Justice and 
Reconciliation Commission 2006, pp. 12).  
 These “waves of repression,” as the Middle East Research and Information Project 
(MERIP) called the events of the Years of Lead at the time, continued throughout the 1970s and 
early 1980s, but by the 1990 it seemed as though the country might be turning a corner as a result 
of external and internal pressures for human rights reforms (MERIP Reports 1977, pp 18). In 
May of 1990, the King authorized the creation of the human rights advisory board Advisory 
Council on Human Rights (ACHR), and in 1991, many of those who had been forcibly 
disappeared or held as political prisoners since the early 1970s were freed (Nouaydi 2003, pp. 
158). This opening up, however, did not mean that the death penalty stop being used, as death 
sentences continued to be handed down by courts in cases that threatened the external and 
internal sovereignty of the country. What it meant, however, was that the implementation of and 
proceedings behind cases concluding with the capital punishment became more accessible to the 
general public, largely due to public demands for less corruption and more accountability. The 
most poignant case that demonstrates this shift is that of Mohamed Mustapha Tabet—whose case 
became widely known as the Tabet Affair. 
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 Tabet was a well-known and well-respected police commissioner in Casablanca until it 
was discovered that he had been kidnapping and videotaping women—some of whom were 
minors—while he raped them for years. Cocky, overly confident, and sure nothing would come 
of the allegations, Tabet watched as the Gendarmerie searched through his apartment, ultimately 
finding 118 videotapes, notebooks, and computer files containing personal information about 
each victim (Smolin 2013, pp. 14). While the state eventually charged him with the abductions 
and rapes of 518 women over a period of 3 years, it is estimated based off of the videotapes and 
Tabet’s own recordkeeping that the true number of victims is closer to 1,600 (Smolin 2013, pp. 
14). In his 2013 book Moroccan Noir: Police, Crime, and Politics in Popular Culture, Jonathon 
Smolin notes that the Tabet affair “was a moment of deep rupture in the country’s history and 
culture. As one newspaper headline explained at the time, it was ‘the crime that profoundly 
shook Moroccan society in all its foundations,’” as it was the first time any high ranking police 
official was arrested and brought to justice for his crimes (Smolin 2013, pp. 15). Prior to this 
moment, the police were a terrifying and brutal force that seemed to operate above the law as 
they maintained Morocco’s internal sovereignty through repression, coercion, and blatant abuse 
of power.  
 The public nature of the Tabet Affair, however, began changing the perception of the 
police as an untouchable institution that got away with gross human rights violations. It was, 
after all, the first time Moroccan journalists were free to cover stories about the police, and 
Tabet’s case was the first subject of a new form of Moroccan journalism: mass media 
sensationalism. The wide reach of the press during the case—which was dubbed the “trial of the 
century”—brought all Moroccans into the conversation about fundamental change after the 
waves of repression that had ruled the country for decades. 
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 After a quick trial, Tabet was sentenced to death and executed by firing squad in Kenitra 
Central Prison on August 9, 1993, only four days after his final appeal was denied by the 
Supreme Court. In a statement released the next day, Amnesty International wrote that although 
more than150 people remained on death row, it was the first known execution to take place in 
Morocco since 1982, eleven years prior (Amnesty International 1993). His execution would, 
however, be the last before a de facto moratorium on executions was established and Morocco 
shifted away from using capital punishment as a way to reiterate external and internal 
sovereignty and began debating its use under Hassan II’s son, King Mohammed VI.  
 
King Mohammed VI and Democratization in the 21st Century 
 Upon his father’s death in 1999, King Mohammed VI ascended to the throne amid a 
period of great change in the nation. At the turn of the twenty-first century, Morocco was facing 
increasing demands, both internally and externally, to engage in human rights reforms and 
political liberalization, including the call to engage in debate with civil society about abolishing 
capital punishment. In attempting to answer this call, the Mohammed VI established the Equity 
and Reconciliation Commission (ERC) on January 7, 2004, modeling it after the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) established in South Africa following the end of apartheid.  
Within a little over a month, Susan Slyomovics writes in “The Moroccan Equity and 
Reconciliation Commission: The Promises of a Human Rights Archive” (2016), “victims of 
torture, disappearance, and arbitrary detention through the reigns of three monarchs from 1956-
1999 of grandfather, father and son produced over 22,000 claims of human rights violation sent 
to the Rabat commission headquarters” (Slyomovics 2016, pp. 15). In its “Summary of the Final 
Report,” the Commission described its mission: 
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The Commission was mandated to assess, research, investigate, arbitrate and make 
recommendations about the gross human rights violations that occurred between 1956 
and the end of 1999. These violations include forced disappearances, arbitrary detention, 
torture, sexual abuse and deprivation from the right to life, as a result of unrestrained and 
inadequate use of state force and coerced exile. This mission’s goal is to foster 
development and dialogue, and to create the grounds for national reconciliation that is 
crucial for a democratic transition in our country towards a state of justice and law, and 
for advancing the values and culture of citizenship and human rights (Kingdom of 
Morocco Justice and Reconciliation Commission 2006, pp. 12).  
 
Like the South African TRC, the Moroccan ERC’s relied primarily upon records, testimonies, 
and oral histories in compiling its final report. In embarking on this truth-seeking mission, the 
King signaled, although indirectly through the ERC, that he was willing to begin discussions 
with civil society about the human rights violations of Morocco’s past and what Morocco’s 
future could look like. This did not, however, mean that he was ready to engage in full discussion 
about the abolition of the death penalty. 
 Under King Hassan II, the death penalty had been used to reinforce Morocco’s external 
and internal sovereignty as a young nation in the midst of state-making, and the issue and 
implementation of death sentences was the state’s way of further entrenching absolute authority. 
Under King Mohammed VI, however, the purpose of the death penalty shifted away from 
protecting state sovereignty to reinforcing the state’s approved social order by imposing death 
sentences on crimes considered to be “immoral.” Despite not having executed anyone since 
Tabet in 1993, Morocco has continued to issue death sentences to offenders of certain crimes. 
The most notable crimes that have received the death penalty since Tabet’s execution fit squarely 
under the “immoral” label that threaten the state’s approved social order. 
 The first of these cases is that of Mohamed Belharash—or the “Killer of el Jadida”—
whose name gained notoriety in June 2001 upon his arrest. The general Moroccan society 
believed serial killers only existed in the West, but Belharash quickly dispelled this myth and 
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became widely known in the media as a serial killer. His crimes—including the rape, murder, 
and robbery of his victims––which began in 1993 and continued to his arrest, were highly sexual 
in nature and therefore, easily condemned as immoral. He was sentenced to death on October 16, 
2001 (Smolin 2013, pp.162). Next, Mohamed Omari, Rachid Jalil, and Hassan Taoussi were 
sentenced to death on August 19, 2003 for their roles in the Casablanca bombings. Despite 
serious improvements in human rights leading up to the terrorist attacks in Casablanca, Smolin 
notes that the situation regressed after the attacks and that a 2004 Human Rights Watch Report 
suggested that “the Moroccan authorities were repeating the tactics of the Years of lead, but this 
time were targeting religious extremists instead of the radical left” (Smolin 2013, pp. 205). Two 
more serial killers—Mohammed Zouita and Abdelali Hadi—were arrested in the following 
years, and their crimes were, like Tabet’s, also described as “sexually disturbed” (Smolin 2013, 
pp. 176). While Zouita committed suicide before his trial, Hadi was found guilty and sentenced 
to death on December 2, 2004 (Smolin 2013, pp. 185). The most recent crime that saw its 
perpetrators put to death, however, is the murders of Scandinavian hikers Louisa Vesterager 
Jespersen and Maren Ueland, who were found beheaded in the High Atlas Mountains in 
December 2018. Investigators soon arrested Abdessamad Ejjoud, Younes Ouaziyad, and Rachid 
Afatti—all of whom had pledged allegiance to the Islamic State—for carrying out, videotaping, 
and sharing the attack. Approximately twenty others were arrested in connection with the killings 
(BBC May 2, 2019). After an eleven-week trial in Salé, all three were sentenced to death (BBC 
July 18, 2019). Their appeals were denied, and their sentences were upheld in October 2019.  
 The death penalty in all of the aforementioned cases was issued for different reasons than 
the death penalty was issued during the Years of Lead. Under King Hassan II, the death penalty 
had been issued in cases that threatened the external and internal sovereignty of the nation, 
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thereby threatening the authority of the monarchy. Under King Mohammed VI, however, the use 
of capital punishment ceased to be used in such a way due to internal and external demands for 
human rights reform and the growing call to abolish capital punishment worldwide. Thus, as 
Morocco began to speed up democratization efforts in the early twenty-first century and started 
engaging in debates with civil society about adopting abolition legislation, the death penalty was 

























 Barr 24 
Conclusion: NGOs and The Abolition of the Death Penalty? 
 Following the reform talks in Meknés in 2003 and 2004 put together by various NGOs, 
the state attempted to “alter the perception that the debate was only for the elites, the 
administration became more engaged, perhaps in response to national and international pressure 
and shaped the debate in both political and legal terms” (Hmimnat 2013, pp. 76). Also in 2003, 
seven NGOs (including the Moroccan Observatory of Prisons) joined together to form The 
Moroccan Coalition Against the Death Penalty. The other NGOs involved are the Moroccan 
Human Rights Association, the Moroccan Forum for Truth and Justice, the Moroccan 
Organization for Human Rights, the Association of Lawyers’ Bars in Morocco, Amnesty 
International—Moroccan Section, and the Centre for People’s Rights. The group has 3 main 
demands: the abolition of the punishment from the law, a cease on issuance of the punishment, 
and a moratorium on executions (Hmimnat 2013, pp. 76). While the new Moroccan constitution 
of 2011 “enshrines the right to life without leaving exception for the death penalty,” further 
momentum on achieving de jure abolition of capital punishment has stalled due to the political 
and religious constraints and limitations on the subject (Shetty 2014, pp. 48).  
 In 2011, a Minnesota-based organization called the Advocates for Human Rights (The 
Advocates) released a report on capital punishment in Morocco, concluding that “certain 
conditions on death row in Morocco constitute cruel, inhumane and/or degrading treatment, due 
primarily but not solely to mismanagement” (The Advocates for Human Rights 2011, pp. 1). In 
their report, the Advocates argue that the 2011 referendum on the Constitution that enshrined the 
“right to life” rendered the death penalty unconstitutional. Despite the apparent illegality of 
capital punishment, the group estimates that prior to 2011, about 10 death sentences were handed 
down each year, and numbers reported since, although not “official figures” released by the 
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government, seem to corroborate the fact that about 10 death sentences have continued to be 
handed down each year since (The Advocates for Human Rights 2011, pp. 3). Ultimately, the 
Advocates recommend in their report that Morocco replace the death penalty with a fairer 
sentence that respects international human rights standards; continue to build new prisons to 
alleviate overcrowding issues that violate international standards as is; and improve the medical 
treatment and food available within prisons (The Advocates for Human Rights 2011, pp. 7). 
 On October 7, 2015, advocates for the abolition of the death penalty—including members 
of the Moroccan Coalition Against the Death Penalty—held a press conference that detailed their 
work over the previous year and submitted a memorandum to the government. “Their main 
demands,” Tiziana Trotta wrote on the World Coalition Against the Death Penalty’s website, 
“include the ratification of the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, the ratification of the Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court and 
a support to the UN resolution on the moratorium, in addition to improving conditions on death 
row” (Trotta 2015). Three years later in 2018, the Moroccan Observatory of Prisons organized a 
conference to reintegrate the abolition of capital punishment into the greater dialogue about 
human rights and criminal justice reform in Morocco. As Clémentine Etienne noted on the 
World Coalition Against the Death Penalty’s website, “although Article 23 of the Constitution 
guarantees the right of detainees and article 20 recognizes the right to life, no compliance has 
been initiated to abolish the death penalty, which is still imposed by the courts. Morocco has 
been under a de facto moratorium since 1993, and in 2017, more than 15 people were sentenced 
to death and 112 are currently detained on death row” (Etienne 2018).  
 During the same 2015 press conference mentioned above, Mustapha Znaidi, the deputy 
coordinator of the Moroccan Coalition Against the Death Penalty, noted that he believes “the 
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biggest obstacle is political, not religious, contrary to the claims of proponents of maintaining 
this sentence, because the source of the Criminal Code is positive law and is inherited from the 
colonial Penal Code. And again, Islam is tolerant and open with respect to this issue” (Trotta 
2015). Thus, it is not Islam preventing the abolishing the death penalty: it is the political 
development of capital punishment in Morocco—which was initially issued by the modern 
Moroccan state as a means of reinforcing state authority and external and internal sovereignty—
which has prevented de jure abolition from being realized on top of the de facto moratorium in 
place since 1993. While promising steps have indeed been made by Morocco as it moves 
towards abolition of capital punishment and Mohammed VI has shown he is willing to allow 
civil society to engage in debate about the topic, it is clear, Hmimnat notes, that “the Kingdom 
remains hesitant in this regard, preferring to compare itself to countries such as Algeria, Tunisia, 
Mauritania and Lebanon that also have a de facto moratorium on executions” (Hmimnat 2013, 
pp.70). It seems as though Mohammed VI is letting the dialogue occur without intervening, 
mostly because he doesn’t have to. His government can continue issuing death sentences in 
crimes deemed “immoral,” and while there may be domestic and foreign pushback from human 
rights leaders, the fact that Morocco’s government exists as a hybrid political regime means that 
at the end of the day, the Mohammed VI has the authority to ignore the calls for abolition.  
 Further research into the subject of capital punishment in Morocco could situate the death 
penalty in the Islamic context by analyzing Hudud, Qisas, and Tazir, and the Quran’s sayings on 
crime and punishment. Also, further research could be done on crime and punishment under 
French colonial rule in Morocco, thereby situating capital punishment in the modern Moroccan 
state in the framework of its colonial system of crime and punishment.  
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